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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 33Abstract
This paper attempts to estimate comparable eﬃciency scores for European banks
operating in the Single Market in the EU. Using a data set of more than 5000
large commercial banks from all major European banking markets over the period
1993-2004, the application of meta-frontiers enables us to assess the existence of
a single and integrated European banking market. We ﬁnd evidence in favor of a
single European banking market characterized by cost and proﬁt meta-frontiers.
However, compared to the meta-frontier estimations, pooled frontier estimations
tend to underestimate eﬃciency levels and correlate poorly with country-speciﬁc
frontier eﬃciency ranks.
Key words: X-eﬃciency, stochastic frontiers, banking, meta-frontiers, technology
gap ratios
JEL classiﬁcation: G21, L11, L22, L23
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The past decades have witnessed a string of regulatory changes, mergers and 
technological advances that together have re-shaped Europe’s banking markets. As a 
result, today’s European banking markets differ substantially from the past. All 
conditions had been set for the effective creation, existence and benefits of a single 
European banking market fostering cross-border competition and increase financial 
integration. But looking back, Berger et al. (2002) observe that despite the enormous 
potential, the immediate effect of all initiatives has been limited to an increase in the 
consolidation of banks and banking markets at the local level. For this reason, it is of 
topmost interest for policy makers, regulatory and monetary authorities, as well as 
expert practitioners and researchers, to know more about the true underlying 
differences or similarities of bank performance and efficiency among European 
countries in order to better adjust to the new environment, to undertake strategic 
decisions, to benchmark banking institutions performance, and to prepare for 
increasing competition in domestic as well as cross-border markets. 
Most previous work in this field estimates the efficiency of banks either in their 
purely separate national context or benchmarks banks in different countries by 
assuming that they access to the same conditions and technology. However, since 
efficiency measurement is a relative concept these approaches do not settle the issue 
of efficiency differences among banks across countries. 
Taken together, this raises the question how comparable Europe’s major banking 
markets are. This paper takes a systematic attempt to provide ‘truly’ comparable 
efficiency scores for the European banking industry. It applies a new method for 
comparing European bank efficiency, while taking into account the fact that banks in 
different countries may not operate under the same circumstances due to differences 
in technology, competition, supervision, etc. 
First, the paper evaluates the efficiency levels of the banking industry by estimating 
banks’ country-specific and pooled cost and profit functions. Second, we identify and 
estimate a so-called “meta-frontier”. This meta-frontier is viewed as an “envelope” 
cost and profit function that encompasses groups of banks that operate under different 
circumstances. In contrast to standard estimation models, it allows for a fair 
comparison of bank efficiency scores across different countries. 
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December 2006Overall, the empirical results suggest that average cost and profit efficiency varies 
considerably across Europe. Our “meta-model” provides bank efficiency scores that 
are close to the efficiency levels from country-specific estimations. As technology 
differences seem to converge across Europe, we find evidence in favor of a single, 
integrated European banking market characterized by a single set of rules, equal 
access and equal treatment. 
Whether individual banks can benefit from the current situation remains to be seen. 
Based on our results, banks that are very efficient in their home country may find it 
hard being equally successful abroad. Seen in this light, our analysis may help to 
explain the limited number of cross-border mergers that have taken place in the 
European banking market since the inception of the single banking market. Our profit 
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The past decades have witnessed a string of regulatory changes, mergers and
technological advances that together have re-shaped Europe’s banking mar-
kets. In the European Union, the First Banking Coordination Directive (1977),
the EU White Paper (1985) and the Second Banking Coordination Directive
(1988) ﬁnally led to the establishment of the Single Market for Financial Ser-
vices on January 1, 1993.
As a result, in the remainder of the 1990s, we observe European banking mar-
kets that are radically diﬀerent from what was common in the past. Equally
important, however, compared to each other these banking markets were in
principle and de jure perceived as being more homogenous than ever. All con-
ditions had been set for the eﬀective creation, existence and beneﬁts of a single
European banking market. But looking back, Berger et al. (2002) observe that
despite the enormous potential, the immediate eﬀect of all the above-described
initiatives has been limited to an increase in the consolidation of banks and
banking markets at the local level. For example, the number of cross-border
mergers has been very limited.
Taken together, this raises the question how comparable Europe’s major bank-
ing markets are. In this paper, we attempt to answer this question by analyzing
whether commercial banks in 15 European countries share a common bench-
mark, that is a common cost or proﬁt frontier for the period 1993-2004. As
stated by Molyneux et al. (1997), eﬃciency is one of the crucial “elements
that impact on the eﬀects of the single ﬁn a n c i a lm a r k e tp l a c e ”( p .9 ) .I nf o -
cusing on X-ineﬃciency, we redress an imbalance in the established eﬃciency
literature. This imbalance is caused by the fact that prior studies compare
X-ineﬃciencies assuming that banks operate under a single frontier technol-
ogy. However, many researchers note that the assumption of a single frontier
is an unsettled issue in the eﬃciency literature (cf. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas,
2000; Chaﬀai et al., 2001; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2001; Bikker, 2002). In this
paper, we estimate comparable eﬃciency scores for banks in diﬀerent coun-
tries, possibly operating with diﬀerent technologies and hence under diﬀerent
frontiers. 2 To this purpose, we use a meta-frontier model that allows us to
calculate eﬃciency scores and technology gaps for European banks. This way,
we can compare eﬃciency scores across countries with diﬀerent frontiers and
measure the degree of homogeneity of Europe’s largest banking markets by
assessing their distance to a European meta-frontier.
2 As we explain in more detail in our methodology section, we allow transformation
functions to diﬀer across countries.
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pares eﬃciency across European banks. Then, in our methodology section we
introduce a standard stochastic frontier proﬁt and cost model, respectively.
We subsequently derive a meta-frontier for each of these models. Next, we
describe our data and introduce the variables we use for our analysis. What
follows is a description of our empirical results. We start by describing tech-
nology gaps between country-speciﬁc frontiers and our meta-frontiers. Then,
we study the (rank) stability of eﬃciency scores. Finally, we review trends in
technology gaps and eﬃciency. In the ﬁnal section, we conclude and draw a
preliminary research agenda.
2L i t e r a t u r e
To our knowledge, no other paper exists that applies stochastic meta-frontiers
to banking. In this section, we therefore present a brief, non-exhaustive overview
of some of the work that has been done on comparing the X-eﬃciency of banks.
The bank eﬃciency literature has a long tradition and cumulated to a sub-
stantial number of studies with diﬀerent methodologies, scope, and results,
e.g. Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Berger et al. (1999). For the U.S.,
Berger and Humphrey (1991) and Berger and Mester (1997) established the
consensus that banks could improve their cost and proﬁte ﬃciency more by
reducing frontier ineﬃciencies than by reaching some optimal level of scale
and scope economies to minimize average costs and to maximize proﬁts. A
number of other studies has emphasized conceptual issues (Lovell, 1993) or
introduced risk variables, e.g. Berg et al. (1992), McAllister and McManus
(1993), Mester (1996), Berger and DeYoung (1997). These studies have in
common that they focus on a single country (mainly the U.S.). Other studies
in this category established that foreign-owned banks are relatively less eﬃ-
cient as domestic-owned owned banks (cf. Hasan and Hunter, 1996; Mahajan
et al., 1996; DeYoung and Nolle, 1996; Chang et al., 1998; Peek et al., 1999).
The number of cross-country comparative studies is still limited. 3 Most of
the cross-country frontier studies focus on the European market. The eﬃciency
results for European banks diﬀer between studies depending on the estimation
technique, sample size, input and output speciﬁcations, and period. Despite
their diﬀerences, some tentative results are noteworthy. Roughly in line with
the experiences in the U.S., most studies suggest that average cost eﬃciency
for European banking industries ranges from 70 percent to 80 percent while
proﬁte ﬃciency levels are found to be lower, at around 50 — 60 percent. Pastor
et al. (1997) conclude that the banking industry in France, Spain, and Belgium
3 Exceptions include Berg et al. (1993), Fecher and Pestieau (1993), Vander Vennet
(1994), Bergendahl (1995), Berg et al. (1995), Allen and Rai (1996), Ruthenberg
and Elias (1996), Pastor et al. (1997), and Vander Vennet (1999).
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and Austria.
Sheldon (1999) uses unconsolidated data for 1,783 commercial and savings
banks in the EU, Norway, and Switzerland for the period 1993-1997. He uses
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to examine cost and proﬁte ﬃciency and
ﬁnds that large banks, specialized banks, and retail banks are more cost and
proﬁte ﬃcient than small banks, diversiﬁed banks, and wholesale banks, re-
spectively. Average frontier eﬃciency is fairly low, at about 45 percent for costs
and 65 percent for proﬁt. Banks in Denmark, France, Luxembourg, and Swe-
den have the highest average eﬃciency, and banks in Greece, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, and U.K. have the lowest average eﬃciency.
Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (2001) ask a similar question and focus on the
German banking market, for the period 1989-1996. 4 They distinguish between
private commercial banks, public savings banks and mutual cooperative banks.
Their main ﬁnding is that private commercial banks are relatively cost and
proﬁti n e ﬃcient when compared to the other banks.
Bos et al. (2005) also study the German banking market, and focus on the
eﬀects of accounting for heterogeneity on bank eﬃciency scores. For the period
1993-2003, they ﬁnd that banks of diﬀerent sizes, geographic origins, and types
(cooperative and savings) have markedly diﬀerent cost eﬃciency scores. How-
ever, more importantly they ﬁnd that results vary greatly with the method
with which this heterogeneity is controlled for. With this ﬁnding, they touch
directly upon what we call the benchmarking paradox: we engage in a bench-
marking exercise in order to measure performance diﬀerences, but in order to
do so, we have to assume a common benchmark.
In fact, this paradox is apparent in the cross-border literature, where banks
are usually compared to a common eﬃcient frontier, thereby assuming that
banks across diﬀerent countries have access to the same technology. However,
when the frontier is applied to each sample country and the performance
of each individual banking institutions is compared against the best-practice
bank in that country, eﬃciency results cannot be compared across borders.
Recent research initiatives attempt to avoid the bias inherent in cross-border
bank eﬃciency comparisons by incorporating country-speciﬁc environmental
conditions (cf. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Chaﬀai et al., 2001; Lozano-
Vivas et al., 2001; Sathye, 2002; Grigorian and Manole, 2002; Lozano-Vivas
et al., 2002).
4 Other recent studies by the same authors have advanced the research on bank
eﬃciency by applying alternative frontier methodologies to estimate scale economies
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tion of a common frontier could yield misleading eﬃciency results of ﬁrms
from diﬀerent countries as such approaches do not control for cross-country
diﬀerences in regulatory, demographic, and economic conditions that are be-
yond a ﬁrm’s control. As a result, the authors ﬁnd that eﬃciency scores based
on the common frontier model tend to be low (high) for ﬁrms that operate
under bad (good) home country conditions.
Similarly, Lozano-Vivas et al. (2001) simulate the performance for each of the
banking market if average banks decide to operate in any other country. They
ﬁnd that some banks can indeed be expected to perform well if they operate in
another country. Finally, Bos and Kolari (2005) compare both large and small
independent European and U.S. banks, respectively. They test whether banks
from Europe and the U.S. operate under the same proﬁta n dc o s tf r o n t i e r ,
and though they ﬁnd evidence in favor of a single proﬁt frontier they reject a
single cost frontier.
These initiatives, as mentioned earlier, do not settle the issue of cross-border
eﬃciency comparisons of banks having access to diﬀerent types and standards
of technologies in diﬀerent countries. This paper attempts to add to the estab-
lished literature by estimating ‘truly’ comparable eﬃciencies across countries
using a meta-frontier model to account for diﬀerent underlying technologies in
the EU banking industry. We next turn to further details of the methodology.
3 Methodology
Eﬃciency benchmarking models in general, and stochastic frontier models in
particular, rely on an often implicit set of assumptions when used to assess and
compare ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬃciency. We brieﬂy discuss a number of these assump-
tions and the implications they have for a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA)
of banking markets. First, we often assume that ﬁrms included in a sample
compete in some way. Of course, this assumption is by no means a necessary
condition for estimating a stochastic frontier model for a speciﬁcs a m p l e .B u t
it becomes important when we wish to assess the ex ante and ex post relevance
of the results from the SFA. A classic way to test this assumption would be to
look at cross-price elasticity of demand. For banks, this is notoriously diﬃcult.
We tend to not know many prices that banks charge: bank-speciﬁc interest
rates, for example, are almost always proxied for. And we tend to not agree
what comprises the prices that banks charge: should we for example include
service charges on a loan, or just the interest rate?
A second, related assumption refers to the deﬁnition of the market these ﬁrms
operate on. Are the products oﬀered by the ﬁrms in the sample completely
10
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once there is agreement on the degree of homogeneity of the outputs, we have
to agree on the total production set. Depending on the degree of specialization,
not all ﬁrms in the sample may use the same inputs and outputs. Bearing in
mind that most models cannot handle zero inputs or outputs, this generally
involves limiting the sample to those ﬁrms that make use of the full range of
inputs and outputs deﬁned by the production set (Berger et al. 2000).
A fourth and related assumption then concerns the functional form of the
production function. Upon applying duality, the same holds for a cost or proﬁt
model. Not all ﬁrms may use the same production techniques. Depending on
the degree of specialization of the ﬁrm and the role of its environment, ﬁrms
may have diﬀerent transformation function an dal a r g e ro rs m a l l e ro p p o r t u n i t y
set — even if they have the same production set. Thus, we are faced with the
paradoxical situation that in order to benchmark the diﬀerences in eﬃciency
of ﬁr m si no u rs a m p l e ,w eh a v et oa s s u m et h a tt h e s eﬁrms operate under the
same frontier. This observation may seem trivial, but it is far less so when we
keep in mind that in most benchmarking exercises we are most interested in
those ﬁrms that are furthest removed from the frontier. Especially those ﬁrms
may not be operating under the same frontier, with the same technology. It
is this problem that we focus on in this paper.
3.1 A Stochastic Frontier Model
Stochastic frontier models are a particular class of benchmarking models. As
with most benchmarking models, SFA yields ﬁrm-speciﬁc estimates that are
comparable. More precisely, it yield ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬃciency estimates drawn
from the same distribution, with the same transformation function T and the
same pricing opportunity set H. 6 When we do not consider a production
model but instead estimate a cost and/or proﬁt model we rely on duality,
but implicitly still require that our eﬃciency estimates result from the same
input-demand and output-supply functions. 7
For a cost model and with k =1 ,...,Kbanks in t =1 ,...,T periods, we deﬁne
cost as TCkt, output prices as Pkt,a n do u t p u t sa sY kt.L e tW kt be input prices
5 Think in this respect for example of a cost model where some of the outputs are
considered substitutes. If an output is produced by some ﬁrms in the sample, and
not by others, then no logarithmic model can be estimated for the whole sample
(bearing in mind that there is no neutral transformation for this logarithmic model).
6 Cf. Coelli (chapter 3, 1998).
7 We refer to Bos (2002) for the precise derivation and assumptions.
8 We use lower case symbols to denote logarithms. We introduce the proﬁtm o d e l
via footnotes. For the proﬁtm o d e l ,p r o ﬁt=Πkt is maximized.
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Min
P,X
TC kt = W
0
ktXkt s.t.T(Xkt,Y kt,Z kt)=0 ( 1 )
Next, we solve simultaneously for P∗
kt(Ykt,W kt,Z kt)a n dX∗
k(Yk,W k,Z k)a n d









TCkt(Ykt,W kt,Z kt). (2)
Hence, the optimal, eﬃcient cost level is a function of the number of outputs,
input prices, and the control variable Zkt. All inputs are variable inputs, and
factor prices Wkt are exogenous. We allow for the impact of technological
change on eﬃciency, by including a linear and quadratic trend term as well
as trend interaction terms. 11 With a 3-input, 3-output translog speciﬁcation,
















ikt+vkt+ukt, for i 6= j (3)
where the endogenous variable tckt is deﬁned as the (log of) total cost of
bank k in period t and m consists of outputs y, input prices w, and control
variable z (equity). A time trend t captures technological change, and εkt =
vkt + ukt. 13 The random error term νkt is assumed i.i.d. with νkt ∼ N(0,σ2
ν)
and independent of the explanatory variables (see Aigner and Schmidt, 1977
and Coelli et al.,1998). The eﬃciency term ukt is i.i.d. with ukt ∼ |N(µ,σ2
u)|
and it is independent of νkt. It is drawn from a non-negative distribution
truncated at µ instead of zero. A point estimator of technical eﬃciency is




ktXkt s.t.T(Xkt,Y kt,Z kt)=
0,H (Pkt,Y kt,W kt,Z kt)=0 .
10 For the proﬁt model, we have:Π∗
kt = P∗
kt(Ykt,W kt,Z kt)0Ykt −
W0
ktX∗
kt(Ykt,W kt,Z kt)=˜ Πkt(Ykt,W kt,Z kt).
11 Cf. Lang (1996) and Altunbas et al. (1999). For a discussion of the translog
speciﬁcation, cf. Berger and Mester (1997) and Swank (1996).
12 Cf. F¨ are and Lovell (1978), Greene (1980), Jondrow et al. (1982), and more re-
cently Battese and Coelli (1988). Duality requires the imposition of symmetry and
linear homogeneity in input prices to estimate our cost model (see Beattie and Tay-
lor 1985; and Lang and Welzel 1999). Whether we also should impose this on the
proﬁt model is a matter of debate (cf. Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000), but doing so
does not aﬀect our estimates.
13 We estimate all models using the three-step procedure outlined in Kumbhakar
and Lovell (2000), and reparameterize σ2
u and σ2
ν by taking σ2 = σ2
u + σ2
ν and
λ = σu/σν. We follow Waldman (1982) and check the skew in the residuals of the
OLS estimation to ensure that estimating our stochastic frontiers with maximum
likelihood estimation is appropriate.
12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 701
December 2006
and Xkt be inputs.8 A l s o ,w ei n c l u d ec o n t r o lv a r i a b l e sZ kt. The minimizationgiven by E(ukt|εkt), i.e., the mean of ukt given εkt. Estimates of bank-speciﬁc
cost eﬃciency are obtained by calculating:
CEkt =[ e x p ( −ukt)]
−1. (4)
This measure takes on a value between 0 and 1. 14 Cost eﬃciency equals one
for a fully eﬃcient bank that operates on the eﬃcient stochastic frontier.
3.2 A Meta-Frontier Model
The methodological issues associated with deriving bank and country-speciﬁc
eﬃciency measures from single cross-country frontiers are increasingly being
discussed in the literature. This is highlighted by the growing number of stud-
ies that investigate (unobserved) heterogeneity among banks in stochastic
frontier analysis (cf Greene 2005, and Bos et al. 2005). Broadly speaking,
the literature discusses two possible eﬀects of this heterogeneity. The ﬁrst is
a parallel shift in the frontiers for diﬀerent groups of banks (from diﬀerent
regions, size classes, specializations). Typically this is done by changing the
speciﬁcation of the deterministic kernel of the frontier model, for example by
including group-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. A second eﬀect discussed in the literature
concerns the impact of heterogeneity on the distributions of the random error
term and or the ineﬃciency term. Here, banks are still assumed to operate un-
der a common frontier, but the accuracy with which we estimate this frontier
and/or the distibution of eﬃciency under the frontier diﬀers per group.
Here, we discuss a third, and potentially very important facet of the bench-
marking paradox. When we estimate our stochastic cost frontier model in
equation 3, we eﬀectively impose a common set of parameters a0, ai, aij and
aii (for i =1 ,...,3, j =1 ,...,3a n di 6= j.P u td i ﬀerently, all banks for which we
estimate the same equation 3 are thereby assumed to share the same produc-
tion technology. For example, two eﬃcient banks with the same input-output
combinations will have the same total cost. And for both banks, an increase
in one of the inputs will have the same impact on total cost. Hence, all banks
that operate under the same frontier are assumed to share the same produc-
tion technology, as characterized by the same transformation function (for a
more formal discussion, see the Appendix).
In Figure 1, we illustrate this with an example where we estimate a simple cost
frontier with two inputs (X1, X2) and a single output (Y ) for two countries
(f =1 ,2). In the graph, we compare country-speciﬁc frontiers with a pooled
frontier and a meta frontier, respectively.
14 For the proﬁtm o d e l ,l e tεkt = νkt − ukt.Aﬁrm speciﬁcc o s te ﬃciency estimate
PEkt of bank k at time t is given by the mean of the conditional distribution of -ukt
given εkt,o rPEkt = E[exp(−uκτ)|εκτ].
13
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Frontier f = 2
Frontier f = 1
X2/Y
X1/Y
single frontiers metafrontier pooled frontier
First, imagine a bank from country f = 1 that is located in E.C o m p a r e d
to its own country-speciﬁc frontier, this bank’s eﬃciency TEkt is (E0/B0)−1.
Compared to a pooled frontier, it is (E0/C0)−1, somewhat higher. However,
a look at Figure 1 reveals that in country f = 1 it is possible to produce the
same output with lower inputs. In fact, meta eﬃciency is (E0/A0)−1. 15
Now suppose the bank located in E is from country f =2 .I nt h a tc a s e ,TE kt
is (E0/D0)−1. Pooled frontier eﬃciency is now lower, at (E0/C0)−1.B u tw e
know that the available production technology in the home country does not
allow any bank in country f = 2 to reach this frontier. Meta eﬃciency is
therefore actually lower, and again at (E0/A0)−1.T h ed i ﬀerence with the
ﬁrst example is that much of the meta eﬃciency is now caused by the large
technology gap ratio (D0/A0)−1.
Thus, dependent on the location of the country-speciﬁc frontiers and the tech-
nology gap ratio we may overestimate the eﬃciency of some banks and under-
estimate the eﬃciency of other banks. Importantly, if there is a single eﬃcient
(meta) frontier, we expect the technology gap ratios to be one in all countries.
What is left is an approximation of the meta-frontier fo (wkt,y kt,zkt). In ﬁnd-
ing this meta-frontier, we rely on the data generation mechanisms from each
15 We can rewrite this as TEkt · TGRkt =( E0/B0)−1 · (B0/A0)−1 =( E0/A0)−1.
14
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[fo (wkt,y kt,zkt)−fn (wkt,y kt,zkt)]2
s.t. : fn (wkt,y kt,zkt) ≥ fo (wkt,y kt,zkt)
(5)
For our translog cost (proﬁt) model, this amounts to ﬁnding the set of param-
eters for which the meta proﬁtf r o n t i e ri sa l w a y sb e l o w( a b o v e )t h eN group
frontiers. 16
Summing up, we have now developed a framework with which we can com-
pare the eﬃciency of banks in N groups, without having to assume that they
operate under a single, identical frontier. Before we apply this framework to
compare banks operating under 15 country-speciﬁcf r o n t i e r s ,w eﬁrst discuss
our data and the variables we use to estimate our proﬁt and cost model.
4D a t a
This study comprises bank’s balance sheet as well as proﬁta n dl o s sa c -
count data of 15 European banking markets over the period 1993-2004. The
data were compiled from the International Bank Credit Analysis Bankscope
Database. As explained above, heterogeneity can aﬀect stochastic frontier
analyses in diﬀerent ways. Since our aim here is to compare similar banks
that operate in diﬀerent markets, we limit our analysis to commercial banks.
In order to estimate separate regional and common frontiers, the sample se-
lection requires us to consider only those countries, for which a suﬃcient large
number of observations is available. 17
We analyze banks from 15 countries, most of which are at present member
16 Estimating meta-frontiers can be precarious (cf. Battese et al. (2004). We min-
imize the squared distance to the frontier, because we want the meta-frontier to
envelope tightly around the N group frontiers. Taking for example the absolute
deviation would ceteris paribus result in a less tight envelope. We use the quasi-
Newton BFGS algorithm. An advantage of this algorithm is the fact that in the line
search, the Hessian matrix is replaced with a matrix that is always positive deﬁnite
(cf. Judd (1999)). We estimate over all parameters, but ﬁxt h ec o e ﬃcients of those
variables with the highest variance inﬂation factors to their pooled frontier values
if necessary (in this case for 4 out of 35 variables).
17 We select independent commercial banks. As a rule of thumb, we include all
European countries for which we have at least 200 observations. An exception is
Sweden, for which we have only 28 observations. However, Sweden’s banking market
is highly integrated with that of Norway. Therefore, we estimate a joint frontier for
Sweden and Norway. Excluding Sweden from our analysis does not aﬀect our results.
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Variable Deﬁnition Mean Std Dev Min. Max.
TC Total cost 672.854 1811.549 0.300 20086.500
PBT Proﬁt before taxes 238.815 787.584 0.100 12293.700
Y1 Loans 18012.140 52902.540 0.100 619690.800
Y2 Investments 15239.140 41809.260 0.100 755379.900
Y3 Oﬀ-balance sheet items 22362.400 195089.100 0.100 5358907.000
W1 Labor price 0.081 0.922 0.000 66.885
W2 Financial capital price 0.012 0.009 0.000 0.220
W3 Physical capital price 1.895 2.381 0.236 29.169
Z Equity/assets 6.921 6.610 0.002 96.852
Assets Total assets 36055.080 98530.220 1000.200 1257998.000
N=9,544. All variables are denoted in 1,000s of USD, corrected for inﬂation
states of the European Union. 18 After excluding all missing and zero ob-
servations, we have an unbalanced panel consisting of 9,544 observations for
commercial banks belonging to 15 European banking markets. All currency
variables are expressed in US dollars and corrected for inﬂation.
I nt h el i t e r a t u r e ,t h ed e ﬁnition of bank inputs and outputs varies across stud-
ies and mainly depends on what a researcher pictures a bank to be. This study
f o l l o w st h es o - c a l l e di n t e r m e d i a t i o na p p r o a c h ,w h i c hv i e w sab a n ka sa ni n -
termediary between depositors and borrowers. Accordingly, bank outputs are
deﬁn e da sl o a n s( Y1)a n di n v e s t m e n t s( Y2), and oﬀ-balance sheet items (Y3).
More precisely, loans comprise commercial and industrial, real estate, con-
sumer, and other outstanding credits. Investments aggregate securities, equity
investments, and other investments. Oﬀ-balance sheet items refer to credits
and other guarantees, which are not reported on the balance sheet. Concern-
ing input prices, the price of labor (W1) equals the total employee expenses
scaled by the total sum of assets. Similarly, the price of ﬁnancial capital (W2)
is measured as the total interest expenses per unit of total assets, and the price
of physical capital (W3) represents all non-interest operating expenses divided
by the sum of assets. Finally, the variable equity/total assets (Z) controls for
diﬀerences in equity capital risk across banks. Banks with lower equity ratios
are assumed to be more risky, in line with Mester (1996). In order to estimate
proﬁta n dc o s te ﬃciency scores, we use the total operating cost (TC)a n d
proﬁts before taxes (PBT) as our dependent variables.
T a b l e1d i s p l a y st h ed e ﬁnition, mean, standard deviation, as well as minimum
and maximum values of all the input prices, outputs, and dependent variables.
18 We also estimated all speciﬁcations for only E.U. countries, again without signif-
icant diﬀerences in results.
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We start this section by comparing results from our estimations. Next, we dis-
cuss the stability of eﬃciency rankings across single, pooled and meta frontiers.
F i n a l l y ,w el o o kf o rp o s s i b l et r e n d si nb o t hm e a ne ﬃciency and technology gap
ratios over the period under investigation.
5.1 Technology gaps
For each country in our sample, Table 2 contains eﬃciency scores for both our
proﬁt and cost model. First, we report the pooled eﬃciency scores, based on
estimations of a ﬁxed eﬀect frontier (cf. Greene, 1995), with country-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects. Second, we include the eﬃciency scores that result from estimat-
ing country-speciﬁc frontiers. Third, we report technology gap ratios and meta
eﬃciency scores that result from enveloping these single frontiers. 19
Of course, an important caveat applies when comparing these eﬃciency scores.
For each speciﬁcation, the scores reﬂect the relative distance to the benchmark.
However, as our example in Figure 1 demonstrates, the benchmark may be
diﬀerent for each speciﬁcation. Still, we can observe some interesting facts
when comparing results across speciﬁcations. First, as in the example in Figure
1, pooled eﬃciency scores can be both lower and higher than single frontier
scores. In most cases, however, they are lower - especially for the cost eﬃciency
scores. Overall, the scores resulting from the common or pooled frontier seem
to underestimate the cost and proﬁte ﬃciency levels for the sample countries.
Our results suggests that the assumption of “one” pooled frontier technology
induces a strong bias in cross-country comparisons and may yield misleading
results. This view is supported by prior ﬁndings in the literature (cf. Bikker,
2002, and Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). 20
A second observation concerns the spread in eﬃciency scores. Pooled scores
tend to have a higher spread. For the cost model, minimum pooled scores tend
to be lower. 21 Taken together, this points into the direction of our earlier
19 Technology gap ratios are calculated as the ratio of expected cost (proﬁt) from
the single frontier estimation and the expected cost (proﬁt from the meta frontier
estimation. For the cost model, the latter is calculated as tcm∗
kt = M∗
kt +tc∗
kt,w h e r e
M∗
kt is the predicted value from estimations of equation 5 and tc∗
kt is expected cost







20 All models were estimated in Limdep 8. All speciﬁcations were estimated with
truncated normal distributions and converged properly.
21 Minimum scores for the pooled speciﬁcations are the same for all countries. This
can be the result of using a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator (see Greene, 2005, for a discus-
sion). We also compared our meta-frontiers to pooled frontiers without ﬁxed eﬀects,
in which case results are even more favorable for the former, especially with respect
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to rank stability.Table 2: Eﬃciency Scores and Technology Gap Ratios [TGR]
Proﬁte ﬃciency [PE] Cost eﬃciency [CE]
Variable Mean SD Min Max ρ Mean SD Min Max ρ
Austria (AT)
pooled 358 0.448 0.176 0.089 0.936 0.613 0.783 0.128 0.512 0.935 0.326
single 358 0.567 0.176 0.189 0.945 0.753 0.126 0.408 0.961
tgr 358 0.900 0.118 0.325 1.000 0.986 0.041 0.548 1.000
meta 358 0.509 0.162 0.061 0.917 0.918 0.744 0.134 0.224 0.938 0.997
Belgium (BE)
pooled 372 0.444 0.215 0.089 0.829 0.652 0.755 0.148 0.512 0.951 0.528
single 372 0.641 0.185 0.388 0.963 0.918 0.024 0.787 0.969
tgr 372 0.945 0.096 0.299 1.000 0.987 0.047 0.582 1.000
meta 372 0.609 0.192 0.116 0.963 0.960 0.907 0.049 0.527 0.960 0.850
Denmark (DK)
pooled 321 0.463 0.195 0.089 0.852 0.301 0.818 0.067 0.597 0.969 0.519
single 321 0.704 0.100 0.645 0.971 0.977 0.006 0.948 0.991
tgr 321 0.940 0.079 0.286 1.000 0.999 0.003 0.974 1.000
meta 321 0.662 0.107 0.185 0.958 0.762 0.975 0.007 0.947 0.985 0.927
France (FR)
pooled 1808 0.409 0.238 0.089 0.897 0.812 0.747 0.145 0.512 0.980 0.823
single 1808 0.504 0.237 0.127 0.925 0.725 0.137 0.444 0.976
tgr 1808 0.953 0.065 0.217 1.000 0.995 0.014 0.770 1.000
meta 1808 0.481 0.229 0.028 0.905 0.986 0.722 0.137 0.342 0.974 0.997
Germany (DE)
pooled 1133 0.388 0.244 0.089 0.910 0.845 0.745 0.143 0.512 0.982 0.810
single 1133 0.445 0.242 0.100 0.899 0.849 0.064 0.795 0.986
tgr 1133 0.973 0.056 0.427 1.000 0.991 0.026 0.697 1.000
meta 1133 0.433 0.237 0.043 0.893 0.990 0.841 0.069 0.554 0.981 0.927
Greece (GR)
pooled 282 0.381 0.240 0.089 0.883 0.458 0.754 0.129 0.512 0.940 0.451
single 282 0.930 0.023 0.915 0.980 0.863 0.067 0.694 0.989
tgr 282 0.908 0.100 0.473 1.000 0.996 0.006 0.961 1.000
meta 282 0.845 0.095 0.433 0.967 0.295 0.859 0.066 0.677 0.977 0.997
Italy (IT)
pooled 1193 0.441 0.209 0.089 0.917 0.157 0.761 0.142 0.512 0.969 0.804
single 1193 0.993 0.001 0.993 1.000 0.818 0.091 0.700 0.988
tgr 1193 0.910 0.132 0.042 1.000 0.995 0.015 0.786 1.000
meta 1193 0.904 0.131 0.041 0.997 0.024 0.813 0.093 0.639 0.986 0.985
Luxembourg (LU)
pooled 745 0.438 0.210 0.089 0.916 0.098 0.753 0.124 0.512 0.979 0.708
single 745 0.720 0.015 0.719 0.951 0.809 0.101 0.570 0.971
tgr 745 0.853 0.083 0.532 1.000 0.995 0.018 0.715 1.000
meta 745 0.614 0.062 0.382 0.903 0.124 0.804 0.101 0.550 0.971 0.983
Mean, Standard Deviation (SD), Minimum (Min.) and Maximum (Max.) eﬃciency scores, and pearson
correlations compared to single frontiers (all signiﬁcant at the 1% level).
observations that pooled frontier estimations can lead to a downward bias in
eﬃciency if technology gap ratios are lower than one. In fact, maximum TGR
scores of one in Table 2 show that single frontiers are partially tangent to the
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Proﬁte ﬃciency [PE] Cost eﬃciency [CE]
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. ρ Mean SD Min Max ρ
Netherlands (NL)
pooled 389 0.479 0.187 0.089 0.891 0.775 0.739 0.141 0.512 0.982 0.393
single 389 0.657 0.187 0.351 0.946 0.715 0.141 0.361 0.954
tgr 389 0.979 0.057 0.126 1.000 0.975 0.040 0.706 1.000
meta 389 0.644 0.189 0.098 0.942 0.981 0.698 0.146 0.318 0.920 0.984
Norway (NO)
pooled 234 0.464 0.207 0.089 0.796 0.600 0.797 0.090 0.537 0.952 0.393
single 234 0.642 0.142 0.526 0.959 0.917 0.049 0.819 0.993
tgr 234 0.962 0.060 0.604 1.000 0.994 0.006 0.976 1.000
meta 234 0.618 0.145 0.340 0.959 0.903 0.911 0.049 0.805 0.984 0.990
Portugal (PT)
pooled 284 0.458 0.196 0.089 0.864 0.557 0.664 0.175 0.512 0.961 0.294
single 284 0.760 0.083 0.471 0.911 0.804 0.068 0.551 0.922
tgr 284 0.934 0.093 0.366 1.000 0.917 0.102 0.478 1.000
meta 284 0.710 0.107 0.263 0.906 0.744 0.739 0.107 0.372 0.887 0.641
Spain (ES)
pooled 1073 0.397 0.246 0.089 0.905 0.216 0.789 0.118 0.512 0.970 0.820
single 1073 0.599 0.072 0.581 0.985 0.833 0.090 0.638 0.982
tgr 1073 0.908 0.101 0.182 1.000 0.997 0.014 0.765 1.000
meta 1073 0.543 0.087 0.108 0.973 0.381 0.830 0.091 0.582 0.978 0.989
Sweden (SE)
pooled 28 0.312 0.278 0.089 0.830 0.540 0.673 0.169 0.512 0.954 0.278
single 28 0.628 0.157 0.526 0.953 0.892 0.059 0.819 0.984
tgr 28 0.892 0.148 0.325 1.000 0.971 0.033 0.891 1.000
meta 28 0.557 0.171 0.274 0.911 0.584 0.865 0.062 0.756 0.982 0.860
Switzerland (CH)
pooled 395 0.444 0.194 0.089 0.896 0.540 0.770 0.118 0.512 0.964 0.610
single 395 0.582 0.167 0.157 0.911 0.860 0.079 0.627 0.974
tgr 395 0.940 0.091 0.365 1.000 0.993 0.021 0.782 1.000
meta 395 0.547 0.163 0.082 0.908 0.584 0.854 0.082 0.553 0.973 0.977
United Kingdom (UK)
pooled 929 0.428 0.225 0.089 0.904 0.648 0.741 0.142 0.512 0.981 0.779
single 929 0.463 0.201 0.113 0.899 0.739 0.130 0.453 0.971
tgr 929 0.954 0.063 0.316 1.000 0.993 0.015 0.892 1.000
meta 929 0.443 0.195 0.045 0.876 0.920 0.734 0.130 0.423 0.970 0.995
Europe
pooled 9544 0.424 0.225 0.089 0.936 0.741 0.757 0.138 0.512 0.982 0.779
single 9544 0.629 0.243 0.100 1.000 0.805 0.122 0.361 0.993
tgr 9544 0.933 0.094 0.042 1.000 0.991 0.031 0.478 1.000
meta 9544 0.584 0.230 0.028 0.997 0.988 0.798 0.125 0.224 0.986 0.995
Mean, Standard Deviation (SD), Minimum (Min.) and Maximum (Max.) eﬃciency scores, and Pearson
correlations compared to single frontiers (all signiﬁcant at the 1% level).
meta frontier in all countries, both for the proﬁta n df o rt h ec o s tm o d e l . 22
But average TGRs vary across countries, and are signiﬁcantly lower than one
22 Battese et al. (2004) found much bigger variations in the technological gap ratios
for Indonesian garment ﬁr m sa c r o s sd i ﬀerent regions.
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in many cases.Finally, Figure 2 compares average pooled and meta eﬃciency scores, weighted
by total assets. The cost and proﬁte ﬃciency of most Scandinavian banks is
signiﬁcantly underestimated when we estimate a pooled frontier, as reﬂected
by shifts of Norway, Denmark and Sweden to the northeast of Figure 2. Banks
in countries with relatively high market concentration experience increases
in proﬁte ﬃciency when they move from a comparison to a pooled frontier
to a comparison to a meta frontier (cf. Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy and
Greece). On the other hand, British’ banks cost and proﬁte ﬃciency decreases
somewhat. German banks’ cost and proﬁte ﬃciency increases, but Germany
remains a laggard. French banks cost eﬃciency decreases when we move to a
meta-frontier.
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ce
arrows point from pooled frontier to meta-frontier results based on mean efficiency scores, weighted by assets
At the very least, our results so far suggest two things. First, with our meta-
frontier approach we can compare country-speciﬁc frontier estimates. This is
an important result, since we can now be critical of pooled frontier estima-
tions, but still arrive at comparable eﬃciency scores. Second, our analysis
suggests that pooled frontiers may not be ﬂexible enough to accomodate the
transformation functions of banks in all European countries. Put diﬀerently,
if we were to place a Swiss, cost eﬃcient bank in e.g. Spain, it is doubtful that
it can be as cost eﬃcient as it is now. This too is an important results, since
it may provide a partial explanation of the scarcity of cross-border mergers.
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model. It is a common ﬁnding in the literature that proﬁte ﬃciency scores
tend to be lower and vary more than cost eﬃciency scores. Our analysis so
far suggests that this may reﬂect the fact that country-speciﬁc circumstances
(competition, regulation, etc.) result in diﬀerent optimal frontiers. In general,
the analysis and Figure 2 show that even in a harmonized single European
banking market, the observed eﬃciency levels of banks varies substantially
across markets. Additionally, it turns o u tt h a tE u r o p e a nb a n k sd on o ta l w a y s
have access to the same benchmark technology. Consequently, these ﬁndings
conﬁrm the view that diﬀerent technologies might be crucial and should be
taken into account when comparing European bank eﬃciency. At the same
time, average technology gap ratios are close to one, proving that diﬀerences
between country-speciﬁc frontiers and a European meta frontier are rather
small for the single European banking market.
5.2 Rankings
As mentioned above, comparing absolute eﬃciency scores across speciﬁcations
has its limitations. In order to further analyze our results, we therefore turn to
eﬃciency rankings. In particular, we are interested in the stability of eﬃciency
rankings. Our approach here is straightforward: we start from the country-
speciﬁce ﬃciency rankings. We build on the premise that any bank that is
a star on its home turf, should still outshine its compatriots when compared
against a European frontier.
As a ﬁrst test, in Figure 3, we compare our pooled and meta-frontier rankings
with our single frontier rankings. In particular, we want to ﬁnd out whether
diﬀerent speciﬁcations identify the same banks as highly eﬃcient and highly
ineﬃcient, respectively. 23 To this end, we rank country-speciﬁc, pooled and
meta-frontier scores and assign them to ten deciles. What we are interested
in is the stability of rankings compared to country-speciﬁc results. In the top
left part of Figure 3 we ask ourselves the question: how many deciles are
banks reranked when we compare their pooled and meta-frontier rankings
to country-speciﬁcr a n k i n g s ?T h el o w e rt h es l o p eo ft h el i n e si nF i g u r e3 ,
the lower rank stability is. 24 F o re x a m p l e ,i nt h et o pl e f to fF i g u r e3 ,w e
observe that approximately 60% of the banks that are identiﬁed as being in
the top decile when we estimate country-speciﬁcp r o ﬁtf r o n t i e r sa r er a n k e d
at most 5 deciles lower when we estimate pooled frontiers. Put diﬀerently,
23 Cf. Bos et al. (2005) for a similar type of analysis.
24 The graphs in Figure 3 can be read as so-called receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curves: if e.g. pooled frontiers and country-speciﬁc frontiers identify exactly
t h es a m eb a n k sa sh i g h l ye ﬃcient, then the (cumulative) number of deciles banks
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when we estimate a pooled frontier. We observe that at both ends of the
distribution, meta-frontier scores have much higher rank stability then pooled
frontier scores.
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X axis measures cumulative number of deciles banks are reranked
Y axis measures cumulative % total of banks as included in single frontier (top or bottom)
pooled meta
Unfortunately, Figure 3 does not tell us much about country-speciﬁcr e s u l t s .
I nT a b l e2 ,w et h e r e f o r ec o m p a r er a n kc o r r e l a t i o n sρ per country. 25 For most
countries, we ﬁnd that rank correlations between the single and meta rankings
are signiﬁcantly higher than those between the single and pooled rankings.
There are some exceptions however. For the proﬁt model, banks in Greece,
Italy, Luxembourg and Spain have very low rank correlations. For Greece and
Italy, rank correlations are even lower for the meta scores than for the pooled
scores. For the cost model, results are more convincing across the board. Again,
this is an important result, which sheds light on our (in)ability to arrive at
comparable and robust eﬃciency scores.
Finally, we take our analysis one step further and study rank stability across
all decile combinations. Table 3 in the Appendix contains transition matrices
for our proﬁt and cost models. For example, the probability that a bank that is
in the highest (100) decile for the single proﬁtf r o n t i e rr a n k i n g si si nt h el o w e s t
25 Correlations shown are Spearman rank correlations. Kendall rank correlations
yield qualitatively similar results.
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that - compared to single frontier rankings - our meta frontier rankings are
not just more stable for top decile and bottom decile banks than our pooled
frontier rankings. In fact, rank stability is higher across the board, as shown
by high probabilities across the diagonal.
5.3 Trends
Finally, we wish to ﬁnd out whether the eﬃciency scores and technology gap
ratios show a particular trend during the period 1993-2004. 26 First, we ask
whether mean eﬃciency has increased since 1993. 27 If the creation of the
single European banking market has increased competition, we expect higher
cost eﬃciency and lower proﬁte ﬃciency. Figure 4 shows that cost eﬃciency
has decreased over the period under consideration. Proﬁte ﬃciency on the
other hand does not show a steady increase or decrease. Rather, it appears to
move with the economic cycle.





























































































































































































































development of tgr per model
For both models, mean eﬃciency scores move in the same direction for diﬀerent
speciﬁcations. An exception is mean pooled proﬁte ﬃciency, which increase
26 Remember that we estimate our models with a trend as explained in equation 3.
However, we do not impose a trend on υkt or on our TGRs.
27 As in Figure 2, mean eﬃciency scores are weighted by total assets.
sharply after 2001, when single and meta scores decrease.
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market. However, a more appropriate way to study the latter is by looking
at mean TGRs and the standard deviation of TGRs. If Europe’s banking
m a r k e t sh a v eb e c o m em o r ea l i k eo v e ro u r1 1y e a rp e r i o du n d e rc o n s i d e r a t i o n ,
we expect an increase in mean TGRs and a decrease in the spread of TGRs.
For the cost model, we observe the exact opposite: mean technology gap ratios
have decreased over time, and the standard deviation of TGRs has increased.
For the proﬁtm o d e l ,w ea g a i no b s e r v en oc l e a rt r e n d .H o w e v e r ,w ed on o t e
that mean proﬁt TGRand its standard deviation move in opposite ways. The
standard deviation tends to be high when averege TGRs are low, and vice
versa. In part, this reﬂects the fact that there are always banks that operate
tangent to the meta-frontier.
Summing up, we indeed ﬁnd evidence in favor of the existince of a single
European banking market, characterized by common (meta) cost and proﬁt
frontiers. However, our results strongly support the view that traditional eﬃ-
ciency techniques basedo np o o l e df r o n t i e re ﬃciency scores tend to underesti-
mate cost and proﬁte ﬃciency levels and may wrongly identify very eﬃcient
and very ineﬃcient banks. Also, we ﬁnd little evidence of a convergence trend.
Rather, single frontiers appear to be partially tangent to the meta-frontiers
from the beginning of the single banking market.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The creation of the Single Market for Financial Services on January 1, 1993
was expected to foster cross-border competition and increase ﬁnancial integra-
tion. Despite the enormous potential, the immediate eﬀect of these initiatives
has been limited to increased consolidation of banks and banking markets at
the local level (Berger et al., 2000). For this reason, it is of topmost interest
for policy makers, regulatory and monetary authorities, as well as expert prac-
titioners and researchers, to know more about the true underlying diﬀerences
or similarities of bank performance and eﬃciency among European countries
in order to better adjust to the new environment, to undertake strategic de-
cisions, to benchmark banking institutions performance, and to prepare for
increasing competition in domestic as well as cross-border markets. Most pre-
vious work on international eﬃciency banking comparisons usually deﬁnes
national or common frontiers by pooling banks from all European countries.
However, since eﬃciency measurement is a relative concept these approaches
do not settle the issue of eﬃciency diﬀerences among the banking industries
across countries.
This paper takes a systematic attempt to provide ‘truly’ comparable eﬃciency
scores for each European banking industry. Although this paper does not
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method for comparing European bank eﬃciency, while taking into account
t h ef a c tt h a tb a n k si nd i ﬀerent countries may not operate under the same
frontier due to diﬀe r e n c e si nt e c h n o l o g y ,c o m p e t i t i o n ,s u p e r v i s i o n ,e t c .F i r s t ,
the paper evaluates the eﬃciency levels of banking industries by estimating
country-speciﬁca n dp o o l e dc o s ta n dp r o ﬁt frontiers. Second, we identify and
estimate a meta-frontier that is designed to encompass all the components of
the country-speciﬁc frontiers for the banks that operate under diﬀerent tech-
nologies. Therefore, the meta-frontier approach allows for a fair comparison of
diﬀerent banking systems by benchmarking the nature of the production pro-
cess for an average bank in each country using the technology that is available
to the industry as a whole.
Overall, the empirical results suggest that average cost and proﬁte ﬃciency
varies considerably across Europe. Our meta-frontiers result in eﬃciency scores
and rankings that are much more in line with country-speciﬁc results. At the
same time, the small technology gap ratios suggest that we are not far removed
from a single European proﬁto rc o s tf r o n t i e r .W h e t h e ri n d i v i d u a lb a n k sc a n
beneﬁt from the current situation remains to be seen. Based on our results,
banks that very eﬃcient in their home country may have a hard time being
equally successful abroad. Seen in this light, our analysis may help explain the
limited number of cross-border mergers that have taken place in the European
banking market since the inception of t h es i n g l eb a n k i n gm a r k e t .O u rp r o ﬁt
model results may imply that local competition is an important determinant
of bank eﬃciency.
Our results shed light on some important policy debates. First, the analysis
presented here is a motivation for further research into the importance of
entry barriers and the signiﬁcance of cross-border price elasticities. Second,
with these results we can be somewhat critical of the idea that countries need
large banks in order to compete European wide. Third, and most important,
our results suggest that - at least initially - the expected welfare gains from
an increase in cross-border mergers may be very limited. Even when eﬃcient
banks take over ineﬃcient banks, eﬃciency may be very hard to export since
it appears to have at least some local determinants.
F i n a l l y ,w ew i s ht op o i n to u ta ni m p o r t a n ta r e af o rf u r t h e rr e s e a r c h .I nt h i s
paper, we have purposely focused on a cross-country comparison of indepen-
dent commercial banks. The reason for this limitation in scope, is the fact
that we aimed to compare banks with a relatively homogenous production set
that are in many ways as comparable as possible. Although our meta-frontier
methodology constitutes a way of arriving at comparable eﬃciency scores for
banks that do not operate under the same “local” frontiers, it does not tell
us how to select banks that have a common production technology. This is a
highly relevant question that we aim to return to in future research.
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Deriving a Meta frontier
In Figure 1, we graphically illustrated the concept of meta-frontiers for a
cost minimization model. Here, we formally derive a meta-frontier for a proﬁt
maximization model.
We started out by examining some of the assumptions on which the proﬁt
and cost model we have derived above are based. Now we relax one important
assumption. As before, we assume that the banks in our sample are compara-
ble, in that they produce the same outputs using the same inputs (albeit not
necessarily in the same proportions). Put diﬀerently, we do not assume that
the banks in our sample compete, but ensure that they could in principle. We
do so by only considering banks with identical productions sets. 28 In addi-
tion, we still assume that all K banks in our sample share the same functional
form. What we no longer assume is that this functional form captures the
same production technology. More precisely, banks can now maximize proﬁts
(minimize costs) using diﬀerent transformation functions T.
Suppose that for a total of K banks, we have separate transformation functions
T for N diﬀerent groups. Our Lagrangian for group n of N then becomes: 29
LΠn = P
0Y − W
0X − λTn(•) − θH(P,Y,W,Z)=0 ( 6 )









n(Y,W,Z)=˜ Πn (Y,W,Z)( 7 )












n(Y,W,Z)=˜ Πn(Y,W,Z)( 8 )
We can then express optimal proﬁts as :
Πo = Po(Y,W,Z)0Y − W0Xo(Y,W,Z)= ˜ Π0 (Y,W,Z)




We follow Battese et al. (2004) and deﬁne this metafrontier as “a determin-
istic parametric function (of speciﬁed functional form) such that its values
are no smaller than the deterministic components of the stochastic frontier
production functions of the diﬀe r e n tg r o u p si n v o l v e d ,f o ra l lg r o u p sa n dt i m e
periods” (p. 3, Battese et al., 2004).
28 Note again that we do not make any assumptions with respect to the weights of
the outputs and inputs in this production set.
29 For ease of notation, we drop the subscripts. So P should now be Pkt,n and so on.
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pbtkt(w,y,z)=fn (w,y,z)+vkt − υkt (10)
We can now decompose bank-speciﬁci n e ﬃciency for a bank k in group n as




· fn (w,y,z)+vkt − υkt (11)
where fo (wi,y i,z) refers to the metafrontier proﬁt function. Then we identify
the two components of the ineﬃciency of bank k in group n.R e c a l lt h a t
νkt ∼ N(0,σ2




, 0 <TE kt ≤ 1( 1 2 )




, 0 ≤ TGRkt ≤ 1( 1 3 )
This is the ratio of the frontier proﬁt for a bank in group n compared to
that bank’s maximum proﬁt that is possible under the metafrontier function.
Hence, TGRvalues range between zero and one, where the latter results if the
single frontier is tangent to the meta frontier. Combined this results in bank




= TE kt · TGR kt , 0 ≤ MEkt ≤ 1( 1 4 )
Thus, the meta-eﬃciency scores are the technical eﬃciencies of each particular
bank in diﬀerent countries corrected by the technological gaps of the banks in
a given country relative to the technology available to the industry as a whole.
Testing stability with transition matrices
In table 3 we report transition matrices with unconditional transition proba-
bilities. Again, our benchmark consists of the country-speciﬁcd e c i l em e m b e r -
ships. As a result, if rank correlation is 1 between e.g. country-speciﬁcf r o n t i e r s
and meta-frontiers, then we obtain a transition matrix with only zeros, except
for the values 100 across the diagonal. We observe that rank stability across
all deciles is highest for the meta-frontier models.
30 Recall that empirically, proﬁte ﬃciency is measured as PEkt =e x p ( −uκτ).
31 For the cost model, fo (w,y,z) ≤ fn (w,y,z)a n dTGRkt =
fo(w,y,z)
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pe pooled 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Total
10 30.55 12.72 14.05 8.51 7.47 6.21 5.25 5.25 5.10 4.88 100
20 30.29 11.11 13.62 9.14 8.24 5.38 6.45 6.27 5.02 4.48 100
30 19.62 7.87 10.60 11.75 11.33 9.97 6.93 7.45 7.87 6.61 100
40 13.22 4.51 12.59 12.38 10.07 11.33 11.02 9.13 8.18 7.56 100
50 8.18 4.40 11.22 12.37 12.26 13.10 12.37 9.33 8.81 7.97 100
60 7.43 3.77 9.42 11.73 10.68 12.15 11.52 12.25 11.31 9.74 100
70 6.93 3.05 8.72 9.24 13.76 11.45 10.29 12.61 11.76 12.18 100
80 7.97 3.67 6.30 9.86 9.44 12.07 12.07 12.70 12.80 13.12 100
90 9.99 4.00 6.83 7.78 8.73 10.20 12.93 12.51 12.83 14.20 100
100 7.45 2.83 6.30 7.45 8.18 7.76 11.65 13.01 16.16 19.20 100
Total 14.18 5.86 9.99 10.00 9.99 10.00 10.00 10.01 9.99 10.01 100
pe meta 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Total
10 92.14 6.60 0.21 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.42 0.31 100
20 5.88 74.29 13.12 2.31 1.26 0.73 0.63 0.31 0.84 0.63 100
30 0.94 11.82 36.72 32.22 11.82 1.67 1.67 0.84 1.05 1.26 100
40 0.00 3.26 29.13 28.92 21.77 6.20 7.05 2.42 0.74 0.53 100
50 0.21 0.63 14.26 20.65 38.05 15.83 7.65 2.20 0.21 0.31 100
60 0.00 0.84 2.73 6.50 15.93 39.83 23.79 7.02 1.89 1.47 100
70 0.00 0.73 0.94 5.87 8.81 24.84 35.64 15.93 4.82 2.41 100
80 0.00 0.11 0.84 2.00 1.58 7.35 17.12 42.33 22.06 6.62 100
90 0.31 0.52 0.73 0.63 0.31 1.89 3.98 22.43 32.91 36.27 100
100 0.53 1.16 1.47 0.74 0.32 1.58 2.63 6.41 34.98 50.21 100
Total 10.01 10.00 10.02 9.99 10.01 10.00 10.02 10.00 9.99 10.00 100
ce pooled 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Total
10 32.54 13.74 12.92 9.81 7.77 6.13 6.05 4.01 3.11 3.92 100
20 24.74 14.06 15.08 11.42 7.32 8.78 6.00 5.56 3.95 3.07 100
30 19.29 9.01 15.30 11.22 9.54 9.33 7.65 7.23 6.71 4.72 100
40 11.74 8.07 11.84 13.00 10.06 12.47 10.17 8.60 8.18 5.87 100
50 8.39 6.72 9.97 10.81 11.65 10.91 11.23 9.65 8.71 11.96 100
60 9.13 5.77 8.60 11.02 12.59 10.60 9.76 12.28 11.96 8.29 100
70 8.49 4.82 6.81 8.49 11.43 11.43 12.05 11.32 12.68 12.47 100
80 4.61 3.35 7.54 8.80 11.10 10.05 12.67 14.14 14.76 12.98 100
90 3.89 3.26 6.31 8.73 9.78 10.20 12.20 14.30 13.77 17.56 100
100 3.25 3.14 6.18 7.23 8.60 10.80 12.26 13.52 16.25 18.76 100
Total 12.83 7.18 10.00 10.01 10.00 10.00 10.01 10.02 9.99 9.99 100
ce meta 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Total
10 85.64 10.27 1.78 0.73 0.42 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.10 0.10 100
20 10.40 76.47 9.77 1.05 0.74 0.63 0.63 0.00 0.21 0.11 100
30 1.47 9.85 65.93 16.46 3.14 0.84 1.05 0.42 0.63 0.21 100
40 0.74 0.53 16.91 52.94 24.89 2.52 0.53 0.63 0.21 0.11 100
50 0.63 1.15 2.41 25.05 54.82 13.63 1.47 0.42 0.31 0.10 100
60 0.31 0.84 0.94 2.20 13.73 66.56 14.26 0.84 0.21 0.10 100
70 0.21 0.42 1.26 0.73 1.26 14.45 66.60 13.30 1.15 0.63 100
80 0.21 0.10 0.42 0.52 0.42 0.73 13.31 68.45 14.99 0.84 100
90 0.32 0.42 0.53 0.21 0.21 0.32 1.16 14.92 72.58 9.35 100
100 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.31 0.00 0.63 0.73 9.55 88.46 100
Total 10.01 10.00 10.01 10.00 10.00 10.01 10.01 10.01 9.99 10.00 100
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